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基于非合作博弈的高耗能工业负荷参与调峰策略
作者:
作者单位:

1.河海大学能源与电气学院,江苏省南京市 211100;2.国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心,江苏省南京市 210000

摘要:

高耗能工业负荷耗电量大、自动化水平高、可控性强,需求响应潜力可观,可作为应对新型电力系统峰谷差持续拉大的重要手段。为此,评估高耗能工业负荷的响应行为,并制定相关策略有利于发挥其调峰潜能。首先,分析了高耗能工业负荷的响应特征,并针对性提出工业负荷参与调峰的阈值判断方法。其次,对典型工业负荷响应行为和调度控制中心决策行为分别建立模型。再次,考虑到调峰市场参与者行为理性特点,建立1-N的非合作博弈模型描述调峰市场参与者间的交互行为。进一步讨论了不同激励方式对调峰市场参与者的影响,并给出相应求解算法。最后,结合某工业园区算例进行仿真分析。结果表明,所提策略的调峰效果显著,且所有调峰市场参与者均能获取最优收益。

关键词:

基金项目:

国家电网公司总部管理科技项目(5100-202218387A-2-0-ZN)资助。

通信作者:

作者简介:

姜婷玉(1995—),女,博士,讲师,主要研究方向:需求响应、辅助服务。E-mail:jtingyuyuki@163.com
陶劲宇(2001—),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:电力系统负荷建模。E-mail:innotao@foxmail.com
王珂(1980—),女,通信作者,博士,教授,主要研究方向:源网荷储互动运行调度、柔性负荷调度。E-mail:20220021@hhu.edu.cn


Non-cooperative Game Based Strategy for Energy-Intensive Industrial Load Participating in Peak-regulation Demand
Author:
Affiliation:

1.College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;2.Marketing Service Center of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Nanjing 210000, China

Abstract:

Energy-intensive industrial loads have high power consumption, high automation levels, and strong controllability, which show great demand response (DR) potentials and can be regarded as an important means to deal with the continuous expansion of the peak-valley difference in the new power system. Therefore, the estimation of the response behaviors of the industrial loads and the formulation of the relevant strategies are helpful to fulfill their DR potentials. Firstly, the response characteristics of the energy-intensive industrial loads are analyzed, and the specific threshold judgment method for industrial loads participating in peak regulation is proposed. Secondly, the models are established to describe the response behaviors of the typical industrial loads and the decision-making behavior of the dispatching and control center, respectively. Thirdly, considering the rationality of the behaviors for peak-regulation market participants, a 1-N non-cooperative game model is established to describe the interaction behaviors between the peak-regulation market participants. Then, the impact of the different incentive modes on peak-regulation market participants is further discussed, and the corresponding solution algorithm is given. Finally, the case simulation analyses are conducted with an industrial park, and the results verify that the proposed strategy has significant peak-regulation effects, and all the peak-regulation market participants can obtain the optimal benefits.

Keywords:

Foundation:
This work is supported by State Grid Corporation of China (No. 5100-202218387A-2-0-ZN).
引用本文
[1]姜婷玉,陶劲宇,王珂,等.基于非合作博弈的高耗能工业负荷参与调峰策略[J].电力系统自动化,2025,49(3):13-21. DOI:10.7500/AEPS20230806003.
JIANG Tingyu, TAO Jinyu, WANG Ke, et al. Non-cooperative Game Based Strategy for Energy-Intensive Industrial Load Participating in Peak-regulation Demand[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2025, 49(3):13-21. DOI:10.7500/AEPS20230806003.
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  • 收稿日期:2023-08-06
  • 最后修改日期:2023-12-18
  • 录用日期:2023-12-18
  • 在线发布日期: 2025-02-07
  • 出版日期: