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电力信息物理系统需求操控攻击策略及防护分析
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作者单位:

1.清华大学电机工程与应用电子技术系,北京市 100084;2.湖南大学电气与信息学院,湖南省长沙市 410082;3.广西电网有限责任公司电力科学研究院,广西壮族自治区南宁市 530023;4.广西电力系统最优化与节能技术重点实验室(广西大学),广西壮族自治区南宁市 530004

摘要:

随着大规模配电网用户侧电力异构物联设备(简称配电网用户侧物联设备)接入电力系统,互联网中用户负荷控制业务的主导地位愈加明显。由此,电力系统存在一条跨越信息物理空间的攻击路径——需求操控攻击,致使电力系统面临一种新型的网络安全威胁。在此背景下,研究需求操控攻击策略对于电力系统抵御该类网络攻击具有重要的指导意义。首先,文中阐述了黑客如何利用配电网用户侧物联设备实施需求操控攻击以及其特点,并基于负荷特征和电力设备运行特征制定电力系统中异常负荷规模约束。然后,以低攻击代价诱导传输线路故障为目的探讨需求操控攻击策略,分析了在该类需求操控攻击情景下传输线路的脆弱性。最后,通过多场景下的多个IEEE节点系统仿真验证了需求操控攻击可以在低代价的条件下影响电力系统运行安全。

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基金项目:

国家资助博士后研究人员计划资助项目(GZC20240788);国家自然科学基金资助项目(51967001)。

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Demand Manipulation Attack Strategy and Analysis of Its Defence for Cyber-Physical Power System
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Affiliation:

Abstract:

With large-scale distribution network user-side heterogeneous power Internet of Things devices (referred to as distribution network user-side IoT devices, UPIDs) integrating into power systems, the dominance of load control service for users on the Internet is becoming increasingly obvious. Thus, there is a cross cyber-physical domain attack path in power systems, manipulation of demand (MAD) attacks, which causes the power system to face a new type of cybersecurity threat. In this background, the research on MAD attack strategy has important guiding significance for power systems to resist such type of cyber attack. Firstly, this paper describes how hackers use distribution network UPIDs to carry out MAD attacks and their characteristics, and further gives constraints of abnormal loads in the power system based on the operation characteristics of loads and power equipment. Then, the MAD attack strategy to induce transmission line fault under the low-cost condition is proposed, pointing out the vulnerability of transmission lines in power systems under this type of MAD attack scenario. Finally, multiple IEEE node system simulations under multiple scenarios verify that MAD attacks can affect power system operation security at a low cost.

Keywords:

Foundation:
This work is supported by State-funded Postdoctoral Researcher Program (No. GZC20240788) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51967001).
引用本文
[1]严康,陆艺丹,白晓清,等.电力信息物理系统需求操控攻击策略及防护分析[J/OL].电力系统自动化,http://doi. org/10.7500/AEPS20240116004.
YAN Kang, LU Yidan, BAI Xiaoqing, et al. Demand Manipulation Attack Strategy and Analysis of Its Defence for Cyber-Physical Power System[J/OL]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, http://doi. org/10.7500/AEPS20240116004.
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  • 收稿日期:2024-01-16
  • 最后修改日期:2025-03-02
  • 录用日期:2024-12-17
  • 在线发布日期: 2025-03-07
  • 出版日期: